On Certainty :: Essays Papers

On conclusionIn his essay An Argument for Skepticism, Peter Unger makes the case for the commonplace form of the skeptical thesis. He is arguing for the position that both type of knowledge is impossible for any person. His argument seems to be a simple one, derived from two very clear hypotheses, but that is not the case. This write up is an try to show that while philosophicall(a)y interesting, Ungers attack on knowledge is not nearly so damaging as he contends. I will argue that Unger mischaracterizes the nature of acceptedty as it is unremarkably used (something he says is important to his argument), and also that he has mischaracterized one of the sources he used to defend this definition. I will accordingly present W.V.O. Quines psychologically based epistemology as presented in Epistemology Naturalized and Two Dogmas of quackery, and argue that this theory provides a more adequate account of the focusing knowledge and certainty are understood. I will also attem pt to address the objections to Quines theory raised by Jaegwon Kim.So, how does one stick an attack on all knowledge? The answer, as it turns out, is quite simply. Ungers argument consists of only two premise. The first of these states that If someone knows something to be so, then it is all proper for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so (238). To this is added the second premise, that It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so (238). Clearly, the conclusion Nobody ever knows that anything is so(238) follows. Unger next alters these premises slightly, adding the idea of overriding considerations. The first premise is the same except with the lyric providing only that no overriding consideration (or considerations) make it not all right (241). Likewise, the second premise becomes It is not the case that it is all right for someone to be absolutely certain that something is so providing only that no overriding (consideration or) considerations make it all right. (242).I am perfectly automatic to grant Unger the first premise. I think that there is no job with allowing him this, in and of itself. Even the second premise is allowable in a certain, philosophically interesting sense, and in this sense, Ungers argument is very strong. The philosophical ideal of absolute certainty is something that I think should be wedded up as a vain pursuit, and I think that Unger shows this nicely.